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COMMENTS
WE'RE ALL IN THE SAME BOAT:
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. v.
SHUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Forum selection clauses have become common additions to
business agreements and play an important role in those agree-
ments.' Such clauses provide that the litigation of any dispute
arising out of the agreement shall be initiated exclusively in the
parties' agreed upon forum.2 By selecting a forum to resolve dis-
putes, forum selection clauses enhance certainty as to the costs
of litigation by preventing jurisdictional conflicts.3 Furthermore,
by reducing the inherent uncertainties involved in international
or interstate contracts, forum selection clauses tend to lessen the
complexity of the transaction and result in a greater feeling of
confidence on behalf of the parties.4 Finally, by stipulating the
forum to hear all disputes, forum selection clauses allow parties
to plan in advance for possible disagreements and encourage
transactions by reducing the fear of exposing oneself to an unfa-
miliar jurisdiction.5
However, as seen in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,6
forum clauses are not without their inadequacies. Carnival
1. See generally Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., Comment, Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp: Uncer-
tainty Requires an Indepth Inquiry into Forum-Selection Clause Enforceability Issues,
17 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 687 (1991). Courts and commentators also refer to forum selec-
tion clauses as "forum clauses," "jurisdiction clauses," "choice-of-forum provisions," or
"consensual adjudicatory procedure."
2. Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Com-
mercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. RaV. 133, 134.
3. Reyes, supra note 1, at 687.
4. See James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate
Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1 (1976).
5. Id. at 3.
6. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
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marks a new step in the Supreme Court's support of forum se-
lection clauses. 7 In Carnival, the Supreme .Court enforced a fo-
rum selection clause, which was buried in small print on the
back of a cruise ticket. This clause obligated a Washington State
passenger to bring suit against the cruise line in Florida.8 The
Court's failure to distinguish the Shutes from the corporate liti-
gants in prior forum selection clause cases is most disturbing.
The Court's almost reflexive enforcement of the cruise ticket fo-
rum clause contravenes public policy by grouping domestic com-
mercial consumer contracts with international commercial con-
tracts between sophisticated business entities.
This Comment contends that the Supreme Court's enforce-
ment of a forum selection clause which binds a non-commercial
plaintiff to a distant jurisdiction, despite the plaintiff's lack of
bargaining power in negotiating the clause, is unfair and viola-
tive of both federal statute and legal precedent. By applying
rigid contractual axioms, the Court has moved away from juris-
dictional canons of fairness traditionally applied in case law and
has failed to defend the consumer whom Congress has sought to
protect.
This Comment will first discuss the history of forum selec-
tion clauses. It will then examine the Court's treatment of the
7. Prior to Carnival, the Supreme Court had given forum selection clauses favored
status in cases involving commercial litigants. The Court started the ball rolling with
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See infra notes 34-68 and ac-
companying text. Thereafter, the Court extended The Bremen to arbitration clauses. In
Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court enforced an agreement be-
tween an American corporation and a German citizen to arbitrate before the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The Court found an agreement to arbitrate before
a pre-determined tribunal to be a specialized kind of forum selection clause.
Likewise, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985), the Supreme Court enforced an arbitration clause in an international contract
that designated Japan as the arbitral venue. The Court allowed arbitration before the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association to determine the parties' rights, despite the
fact that the merits of the case were controlled by United States antitrust laws. The
Court concluded that concerns for international comity, respect for foreign tribunals, and
the need for predictability in the international commercial system required enforcement
of the agreement. Id. at 629.
Further, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), the Su-
preme Court held that federal law governs motions to transfer based on forum selection
clauses. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion observed that enforcement of forum
clauses serves the dual role of protecting a party's expectations and furthering the inter-
ests of the justice system. According to Justice Kennedy, forum selection clauses should
be given "controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases." Id. at 33 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
8. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
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forum selection clause in Carnival and how such a clause has
been historically interpreted. Next, this Comment will address
the Court's failure to uphold Congressional intent as evidenced
by the Limitation of Liability Act.9 The Limitation of Liability
Act manifested Congress' intention to guard against liability
limiting clauses such as the one in Carnival; however, the
Court's problematic interpretation misconstrued this plan. This
Comment will also examine how other countries treat forum se-
lection clauses in order to show how the Carnival decision may
be amplified on an international scale. Furthermore, this Com-
ment will discuss the potential effects of Carnival on interna-
tional travel and the next probable step in forum selection
clauses, namely, the travel industry's incorporation of foreign ju-
risdictions as the contractual forum. Finally, this Comment will
propose an alternative standard, based on jurisdictional princi-
ples, for future courts to employ when faced with forum clauses
designating foreign venues.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Forum Selection Clauses
Forum selection clauses are one of the most important and
effective devices parties can use in an attempt to bring stability
and certainty to a contractual agreement. 10 Parties selecting a
specific forum can designate a particular court that may be bet-
ter suited to resolve potential disputes arising under the con-
tract and may thereby avoid jurisdictional conflicts."1 Further-
more, forum selection clauses help the international commercial
system instill predictability because such clauses remove the un-
certainty of litigating a dispute in an unfamiliar jurisdiction.12
Consequently, the use of forum selection clauses in international
contracts has become common. 3
As a general rule, parties to a contract may agree in advance
to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court should litigation
arise. 1 4 Consent, even prior to the existence of an action, may
9. 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1988).
10. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 134.
11. See Reyes, supra note 1, at 687.
12. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985); see also Reyes, supra note 1, at 687.
13. Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Hague Conference on Private International Law and
the Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 AM. J. CoMp. L. 157 (1964).
14. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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enable a court to exercise jurisdiction over such parties. 15 Never-
theless, many factors, including the traditional deference to the
plaintiff's choice of forum,"6 have provided for an inconsistent
history for the enforcement of forum selection clauses in the
United States. Prior to 1955, American courts refused to give
effect to forum selection clauses that would oust the jurisdiction
of the court.17 Generally, the courts held such clauses void as
against public policy in that they attempted to bar an action in
an otherwise competent jurisdiction."8 An additional public pol-
icy argument appeared when the clauses were contained in adhe-
sion contracts, thus being the product of unequal bargaining
power."9
In 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit broke
the trend of invalidating forum selection clauses in Wm. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd..20 Muller involved
a bill of lading that conferred jurisdiction to the courts of Swe-
den.2 In Muller, the plaintiff brought suit in New York after
cargo it shipped on the defendant's vessel was lost at sea.2 2 The
Second Circuit employed a reasonableness test in evaluating the
forum clause.23 While the plaintiff claimed that the enforcement
of the forum clause would violate the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA)24 (since COGSA declares void clauses lessening a
carrier's liability), the Second Circuit enforced the clause under
the reasonableness test. The court listed five factors for its deci-
sion: (1) ownership of the vessel; (2) nationality of the crew; (3)
whether the chosen court would apply the same measure of
damages as the current forum; (4) whether the chosen forum's
limitation proceedings would be more restrictive than the cur-
rent forum's; and (5) the likelihood of fair and just adjudication
of the dispute in the chosen forum.2 A number of federal courts
followed the trend signalled in Muller and enforced forum selec-
15. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 6.
16. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("[U]nless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.").
17. See Reyes, supra note 1, at 691.
18. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 139.
19. See Reyes, supra note 1, at 691-92.




24. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1988).
25. Muller, 224 F.2d at 808; see also Reyes, supra note 1, at 693.
[Vol. XVIII:2
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tion clauses by following the Muller criteria or a variation of the
Muller scheme.26
Although Muller provided courts with an alternative to the
traditional approach, many courts continued to employ public
policy considerations in invalidating forum clauses." For exam-
ple, in 1958, the Fifth Circuit, in Carbon Black Export v. The
S.S. Monrosa, invoked the traditional rule that "agreements in
advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of
the court are contrary to public policy and will not be
enforced.
'29
Despite the trend signalled by Muller and the cases that
followed its decision, in 1967, Muller was overruled in Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg.30 Muller was overruled on the same
grounds that the Second Circuit applied in Indussa, namely,
that forum selection clauses are inconsistent with COGSA.31
This change in reasoning came about because the Second Cir-
cuit, en banc, decided that "the Muller court leaned too heavily
on general principles of contract law and gave insufficient effect
to the enactments of Congress." 32 Indussa clearly weakened the
foundation for forum clauses, however, the reasonableness test
employed in Muller remained persuasive authority in non-admi-
ralty cases. 33
B. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
Subsequent to Muller, the leading case on forum selection
clauses was The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., a case based
on an admiralty claim decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1972. 34 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the
26. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 140-41; Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Fo-
rum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 766 (E.D. Mich. 1967)
(forum clause enforced under Muller reasonableness test); National Equip. Rental, Ltd.
v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756, 761-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (forum clauses enforceable if not
unreasonable).
27. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 17 n.84.
28. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
29. Id. at 300-01. In Carbon Black, a forum clause in a bill of lading, selecting Italy
as the contractual forum, was not enforced after the American plaintiff brought an action
in admiralty alleging damages due to nondelivery. Id.
30. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
31. Id. at 204; see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 16-17.
32. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 202.
33. See Reyes, supra note 1, at 693-94; see also Gruson, supra note 2, at 141 n.26.
34. The Bremen is not limited to admiralty claims but applies to all forum selection
1992]
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Court enforced a provision of an international maritime towage
contract which provided that "[a]ny dispute arising must be
treated before the London Court of Justice."3 5
At issue was a towage contract between Zapata, an Ameri-
can corporation, and Unterweser, a German corporation.3 6 Un-
terweser contracted to tow Zapata's drilling rig, the Chaparral,
from Louisiana to Italy.3 7 The contract, which was subject to re-
view and underwent several modifications from the original sub-
mission, included a choice of forum clause providing that all dis-
putes under the contract would be brought in London. 8
Additionally, the contract contained two exculpatory clauses
purporting to exempt Unterweser from liability for damages to
the drilling rig.39
After Unterweser's tug, the Bremen, departed Louisiana
with the Chaparral in tow, a storm arose which seriously dam-
aged the rig.40 While in international waters, the Bremen was
instructed by Zapata to take refuge in Tampa, Florida.41 Based
on the injury to their rig, Zapata brought suit in admiralty in
the United States District Court in Tampa seeking damages for
negligent towage and breach of contract. 42 In response, Un-
terweser invoked the forum selection clause and motioned to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens
grounds or, in the alternative, to stay the suit pending submis-
sion of the dispute to the London Court of Justice.43 Unterweser
then sued Zapata in London for breach of contract.44 The
United States District Court refused to enforce the forum selec-
clauses even if they arise in diversity cases. Gruson, supra note 2, at 149.




39. Id. at 3.
The General Towage Conditions of the contract included:
1.... [Unterweser and its] masters and crews are not responsible for defaults and/or
errors in the navigation of the tow.




42. Id. at 4. See Jones v. Bender Welding and Machine Works, Inc., 581 F,2d 1331,
1337 (9th Cir. 1978) (Admiralty law encompasses maritime torts where the locus of the
tort occurs on the high seas and the alleged wrong bears a significant relationship to a
traditional maritime activity.).




tion clause on the traditional ground that agreements attempt-
ing to confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court are invalid on
public policy grounds.4 5 The district court also denied Un-
terweser's forum non conveniens motion and enjoined Un-
terweser from proceeding with the London suit, concluding that
Zapata's choice of forum should not be disturbed.4 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed and adopted
the district court's judgment.47
In an 8 to 1 decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit ruling.48 The Court held that forum se-
lection clauses are prima facie valid unless enforcement is shown
to be unreasonable. 49 The Court recognized the proposition,
stated in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,50 that
parties may validly consent to jurisdiction of a given court in
advance.51 Chief Justice Burger specifically noted that The
Bremen did not involve a local conflict between Americans try-
ing to settle their disputes in a "remote alien forum."52 The
Chief Justice stated that in such a case, the remoteness of the
venue would carry greater weight in determining the reasonable-
ness of the forum clause. 53 Alternatively, in a case such as The
Bremen, involving an international commercial transaction, the
Court placed a "heavy burden" 4 of proof on the party petition-
ing the non-contractual forum to show that the clause was un-
reasonable or unjust or that the clause was invalid for reasons
such as fraud or overweening bargaining power.55 In reaching
this conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that expansion
of overseas commercial and industrial activities would not be en-
couraged if the Court was to adhere to a "parochial concept" 56
45. Id. at 6.
Forum selection clauses have two effects; one is prorogation, which is consent to the
jurisdiction of a particular court and the other is derogation, constituting a denial of
exercise of jurisdiction to any court other than the contracted forum. For a fuller discus-
sion of the effects of forum selection clauses, see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5.
46. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6-7.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 10.
50. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
51. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11 (citing National Equip.'Rental, 375 U.S. at 315-16).
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 9.
1992]
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that all disputes must be resolved in American courts. 7
Further, the Court stated that in cases involving freely ne-
gotiated contracts, the Court would place less emphasis on the
remoteness of the contractual forum.5 8 In considering the rea-
sonableness of this particular forum, the Court specifically noted
that the choice of forum was made by "experienced and sophis-
ticated businessmen" and was unaffected by "undue influ-
ence."59 Furthermore, there was evidence that the choice of Eng-
land as the contractual forum was essential to the contract as an
effort to bring certainty to the agreement. This certainty derived
from England's neutrality in deciding disputes arising from voy-
ages that transverse the waters of many jurisdictions. Addi-
tionally, this forum choice also served to allow the parties to
take advantage of England's "long experience in admiralty liti-
gation."'" Thus, The Bremen provided a new and more open ap-
proach whereby United States courts would give effect to freely
negotiated foreign forum clauses.
The Bremen controls the field of admiralty to the extent
that no federal legislation to the contrary applies.6 2 At first
glance, it may appear that the "lessening of liability" provision
of the COGSA63 applies to the forum selection clause in The
Bremen. COGSA pertains to "all contracts for carriage of goods
by sea to or from ports of the United States.' ' 64 However, the
Supreme Court expressly noted the inapplicability of COGSA to
the towage contract.6 5 More specifically, the Court reasoned that
since The Bremen did not arise out of a contract of carriage,
COGSA was not applicable to the case at hand.6
Since The Bremen, the Supreme Court has supported the
use of forum selection clauses in contracts between sophisticated
businesspersons and has held these clauses to be prima facie
57. Id.
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12-13.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road
to Zapata, 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 124, 134 (1973).
63. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1988).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
65. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 n.11.
66. Id.; see also Wade H. Gately, Comment, Union Insurance Society of Canton,
Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon - the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and Forum Selection Clauses,
10 DENY. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 593, 594 (1981).
[Vol. XVlII:2604
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valid. Nonetheless, the Court has also displayed hesitation in
enforcing such clauses if a party can show that enforcement
would be unreasonable, against public policy, or if the parties
who sued would be deprived of their day in court because the
contractual forum would be gravely inconvenient.6 8
III. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. V. SHUTE
A. Facts
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Shutes, resi-
dents of the State of Washington, purchased tickets from a
Washington travel agent for a seven day cruise aboard the Car-
nival Cruise Lines (Carnival) ship, the Tropicale .6  The cruise
was set to sail from Los Angeles, California, to Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico.70 The tickets were issued by Carnival in Miami, Florida,
which served as Carnival's principal place of business, and were
forwarded to the Shutes in Washington.7'
The passage contract ticket contained a forum selection
clause requiring all disputes-which should arise to be litigated in
Florida. " The clause, typed in fine print,73 read as follows:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that
all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connec-
tion with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all,
in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to
the exclusion of the courts of any other state or country. 4
A further reading of the ticket reveals a clause preventing a
refund for an unused ticket. Paragraph 16(a) of the ticket pro-
vides, "[t]he Carrier shall not be liable to make any refund to
passengers in respect of. . .tickets wholly or partly not used by
. 67. Linda S. Mullenix, If They Could Sue Me Now: Minimum Contacts on the Love
Boat, 1990-91 Term Panvinw, U.S. Sup. CT. CASES, 135, 137; see also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (praising the values of inter-
national comity, sensitivity to international commercial system, and predictability).
68. Mullenix, supra note 67, at 137.




73. The small type size and the forum selection provision's position as the eighth of
twenty-five paragraphs on the back of the ticket prompted Justice Stevens to append a
facsimile of the ticket to the Court's opinion. Id. at 1536.
74. Id.
19921
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a passenger. 7
While in international waters, Mrs. Shute was injured when
she slipped on a deck mat during a conducted tour of the ship.76
The Shutes filed suit against Carnival Cruise Lines in Washing-
ton District Court, alleging negligence on the part of Carnival
Cruise Lines and its employees."
B. District Court Decision
Although Carnival disseminates advertising in Washington,
holds seminars in Washington and distributes brochures to
Washington travel agents, who in turn pass them along to poten-
tial customers, the district court, in an unreported opinion,
granted Carnival's motion for summary judgment based on lack
of personal jurisdiction.7 The district court found Carnival's
contacts with Washington to be insufficient to support the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction.7 9 The court based its decision on
the fact that Carnival is not registered to do business in Wash-
ington, owns no property in Washington and has never operated
ships in Washington ports.8 0 Because the district court found
personal jurisdiction lacking, it did not address the forum selec-
tion clause issue.
C. Circuit Court Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court's granting of summary judgment,
thereby holding Carnival's forum related activities sufficient to
assert jurisdiction.8' Since the court found personal jurisdiction
to be present, it then had to address the forum clause issue in
order to determine whether the court would be divested of juris-
diction. Addressing this issue, the court found the forum selec-
tion clause to be unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
82
75. Id. at 1529.
76. Id. at 1524. Mrs. Shute's two-page complaint, filed in Seattle, Washington,
stated: "During the tour, members of the vessel's crew negligently placed water on the
vessel's deck in the galley area, directly in the path of egress of the passengers taking the
guided tour. Plaintiff Eulala Shute slipped on the wet deck and was severely injured."
See Mullenix, supra note 67, at 135.
77. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
78. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 389.
82. Id.
[Vol. XVIII:2
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In an effort to reaffirm and define the Ninth Circuit's juris-
dictional standards, the Court of Appeals explicitly adopted a
"but for" test in analyzing whether a cause of action arises from
a defendant's solicitation of business in the forum.s The "but
for" test requires a causal nexus between the cause of action and
the defendant's forum activities.8 4 In this case, the court found
that Mrs. Shute never would have been injured but for Carni-
val's solicitation of business in Washington."5 In asserting juris-
diction through the "but for" test, the Ninth Circuit also held
that exercising personal jurisdiction over Carnival comported
with due process since Carnival had purposely availed itself of
the privilege of doing business in Washington.s8
Next, the Court of Appeals examined the effect of the forum
selection clause upon the question of jurisdiction.s Carnival
83. Id. at 385.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 386.
86. The Court of Appeals found Carnival's contacts with Washington insufficient to
exercise general jurisdiction. Carnival's contacts with Washington were not deemed con-
tinuous and systematic; thus, an exercise of general jurisdiction would violate due pro-
cess. However, under the Ninth Circuit's three pronged specific jurisdiction test, an exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction over Carnival comports with due process. The three-part test
provides: (1) the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum; (2) the claim must arise out of the defendant's activities (the
"but-for" test); and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id. at 381; see
also Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
The Court of Appeals found Washington's long-arm statute to be satisfied as well.
The Ninth Circuit withdrew its initial opinion and requested that the Washington Su-
preme Court render a decision concerning the reach of the state's jurisdictional statute.
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 872 F.2d 930, 930 (9th Cir. 1989). The Washington
Supreme Court held that assertion of personal jurisdiction over Carnival Cruise Lines
would not offend the long-arm statute. The court buttressed its holding by stating that
the long-arm statute extended as far as permitted by constitutional due process require-
ments. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 78 (Wash. 1989). Thereafter, the
Ninth Circuit amended its opinion repeating its original conclusions. Shute, 897 F.2d at
377.
The Washington jurisdictional statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (West
1988), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1 "(1) Any person whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who, in
person or through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated,
thereby submits said person, and if an individual, his personal representative,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of said acts: (a) the transaction of any business within the state
87. Carnival attempted to quash jurisdiction by showing that Washington would be
an unreasonable forum since the contracted forum was Florida. However, the Court of
Appeals stated that Carnival proffered no authority that a forum selection clause can be
used to derogate Washington's jurisdiction. Shute, 897 F.2d at 386.
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maintained that even if it was subject to personal jurisdiction in
Washington, the district court was required to transfer the ac-
tion to a Florida court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which
provides for the dismissal or transfer of cases brought in the
wrong venue. 8 In response to this argument, the Ninth Circuit
held that the forum selection clause in this case was unreasona-
ble and, therefore, unenforceable.8 " In determining the effect of
the forum selection clause, the Supreme Court's decision in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. guided the Ninth Circuit's
analysis. According to The Bremen, forum selection clauses are
prima facie valid unless "enforcement would be unreasonable
and unjust or the clause is invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching." 90 Following the Supreme Court's mandates, the
Court of Appeals found Carnival's forum selection clause to be
unreasonable for two reasons. First, unlike the parties in The
Bremen, the parties in Carnival were unequal in bargaining
power."' Indeed, the Shutes had no opportunity to bargain over
the provision and were, in fact, presented the provision on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis.2 The Ninth Circuit placed great
weight upon this disparity of bargaining power in holding the
clause unenforceable.9 3 Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the
clause was unenforceable because of the grave inconvenience
which would be presented to the Shutes and potential witnesses
should the litigation occur in Florida.94 The Circuit Court noted
that the Shutes were "physically and financially incapable" of
litigating the case in Florida. 5 Once again focusing on the lan-
guage of The Bremen, the Circuit Court stated that enforcement
of the forum selection provision would "deprive the Shutes of
88. Id. at 387. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) states:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought.
89. Shute, 897 F.2d at 389.
90. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
91. Shute, 897 F.2d at 388; see also Yoder v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 630 F.
Supp. 756, (E.D. Va. 1986) (unequal bargaining power and use of form contracts are
factors in determining enforceability of forum selection clauses).
92. Shute, 897 F.2d at 388.
93. Id. at 389.
Forum selection clauses in adhesion ("take-it-or-leave-it") contracts have always
been faced by judicial hostility. See, e.g., Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104
(S.D. Miss. 1979).




their day in court. 96
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit only briefly ad-
dressed the plaintiff's assertions regarding statutory law. The
plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of the forum selection clause
would violate the Limitation of Liability Act.9 7 This Act makes
it unlawful for vessel owners to include in a ticket contract pro-
visions "purporting . . to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of
any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction on the
question of liability for such loss, or injury, or the measure of
damages therefore." 98 Any contract provision that violates this
statute is void.9 Circuit Judge Fletcher, writing for the Ninth
Circuit, refused to address the effect of the statute on forum se-
lection agreements. Judge Fletcher reasoned that because the
Circuit found the clause unenforceable as a matter of public pol-
icy, the statute did not have to be addressed.100 However, Judge
Fletcher did comment that Congress' intent in passing the stat-
ute was to provide for closer examination of the fairness of a
form ticket contract.'0' Nevertheless, because the forum selec-
tion provision violated the strong public policy of the circuit, the
Court of Appeals declined to examine the provision under a stat-
utory light.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit expounded two essential rulings.
First, it held that by its continuous solicitation in Washington
State, Carnival Cruise Lines had availed itself of the benefits of
Washington state and thus, the Shutes claim "arose out of' Car-
nival's dissemination of advertising in the state. 0 2 Indeed, "but-
for" Carnival's solicitation, the Shutes never would have gone on
the cruise that led to her slip-and-fall.10 3 Second, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the forum selection clause to be unenforceable be-
cause it would effectively deny the Shutes their day in court and
because the clause was not freely bargained for.10 4 In order to
96. Id.; see The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) ("[I]t should
be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the con-
tractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court.").
97. Shute, 897 F.2d at 389 n.12; 46 U.S.C. § 183c.
98. 46 U.S.C. § 183c.
99. Id.
100. Shute, 897 F.2d at 389 n.12.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 383, 386.
103. Id. at 386.
104. Id. at 389.
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resolve the questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of its con-
tractual forum clause, Carnival Cruise Lines appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and enforced the forum selection clause in Mrs. Shute's
cruise ticket.10 5 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Blackmun, rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning that a forum
selection clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable
due to lack of equal bargaining power.10 The Court, applying
the principles articulated in The Bremen, adopted a reasonable-
ness test for consumer contracts and, after weighing the facts,
found the clause enforceable.
Justice Blackmun, expressing the views of seven members of
the court, identified four reasons why the forum selection clause
was reasonable. 10 7 First, since cruise lines carry passengers from
all over the world, cruise lines have an interest in limiting the
fora where they will be subject to suit. 08 Second, choice-of-fo-
rum clauses add certainty by specifying the forum in which suits
must be brought, thereby sparing litigants needless costs. 09
Third, forum selection clauses conserve judicial resources by ob-
viating the need to decide jurisdictional issues." 0 Finally, by
limiting the fora in which it may be sued, a cruise line is able to
offer reduced fares to passengers."' Under this analysis, the
Court reshaped The Bremen reasonableness standard to "ac-
count for the realities of form passage contracts."" 2 Thus, a fo-
rum selection clause no longer has to be "bargained for" to be
enforceable." 3
In reaching its determination, the majority criticized the
Ninth Circuit's use of the language articulated in The
105. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527-28 (1991).







113. Id. ("... an individual will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.").
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Bremen.114 In The Bremen, the Court evaluated a hypothetical
agreement set in a "remote alien forum."1"' In examining this
hypothetical, The Bremen Court stated that "the serious incon-
venience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties
might carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of
the forum clause."" 6 By analogizing this hypothetical to the case
at hand, the Court of Appeals found "independent justification"
to hold that the clause should not be enforced because of the
hardship claimed by the Shutes.11 7 In contrast to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's determination, the Supreme Court found no evidence of
physical or financial hardship and determined that Florida is
not a "remote alien forum," thus distinguishing The Bremen hy-
pothetical." 8 Additionally, Justice Blackmun reasoned that
since the Shutes admitted that they had notice of the forum
clause, they did not satisfy the "heavy burden of proof"' stan-
dard of serious inconvenience set forth in The Bremen."9
Next, the majority rejected the Shutes contention that the
forum selection clause violates section 183c of the Limitation of
Liability Act. "0 Again, section 183c provides that a shipowner
cannot limit the amount of its liability by inserting a provision
denying the right of a claimant to litigate a claim "by [a] court
of competent jurisdiction."'' The Court held that the forum se-
lection clause did not violate section 183c because Florida is a
"court of competent jurisdiction" within the plain language of
114. Id. (".... the Court of Appeals' analysis seems to us to have distorted some-
what this Court's holding in The Bremen.").
115. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407. U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
116. Id.
117. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d. 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
119. Id.; see The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17.
120. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. 46 U.S.C. § 183c provides:
"It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any ves-
sel transporting passengers between ports of the United States or between any
such port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation, contract, or agree-
ment any provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or
bodily injury arising from the negligence or fault of such owner or his servants,
to relieve such owner, master, or agent from liability, or from liability beyond
any stipulated amount, for such loss or injury, or (2) purporting in such event
to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of
competent jurisdiction on the question of liability for such loss or injury, or the
measure of damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in
any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are hereby declared to be
against public policy and shall be null and void and of no effect."
121. See 46 U.S.C. § 183c(2).
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the statute.122 In response to plaintiffs' claim that enforcement
of the clause would violate Congress' intended goal, 12 3 the Court
referred to legislative history to show that the statute was not
meant to invalidate all forum selection clauses. 24 Instead, the
Court suggested that Congress merely intended the statute to
prevent shipowners from limiting liability for negligence or from
removing the issue of negligence from judicial scrutiny.12' The
Court reasoned that because the forum clause does allow for ju-
dicial resolution in Florida, the clause does not violate section
183c. 126 Thus, the majority utilized the literal meaning of the
statute and the grounds for it to reject the Shutes' claim that
the forum clause violated section 183c.
2. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissent
which not only questioned the majority's analysis, but expressed
concern for consumers as well. The dissent rejected the major-
ity's view that the clause was reasonable and cited the liberal
intent of The Limitation of Liability Act as well as cases analyz-
ing the analogous provision of COGSA to support its view that
the clause should not be enforced.
Justice Stevens began by commenting on the unfairness of
the clause. 27 Justice Stevens, who appended a facsimile of the
Shutes' ticket to the opinion, wrote, "only the most meticulous
passenger is likely to become aware of the forum selection provi-
sion." 2 The dissent also pointed out that the clause making the
ticket non-refundable places the average passenger in a no-win
situation. Indeed, the dissent noted that passengers must either
risk having to file suit in Florida or forfeit their money. 29 Jus-
122. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
123. Id. at 1529. Justice Blackmun reasoned that plaintiffs' claim of hardship was
based on the distance of the forum (Washington to Florida) and that their contention
was that § 183c was enacted to avoid having a plaintiff travel a great distance.
124. The Court found that the legislative history of § 183c suggested that the sec-
tion was enacted to guard against the removal of the issue of liability from any court by
means of a contractual clause. See S. REP. No. 2061, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936); H.R.
REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
125. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. Clearly, Justice Stevens appended a facsimile of the ticket and wrote about
the "meticulous passenger" in a direct response to the majority's implication that a Car-




tice Stevens concluded that the no-refund clause, coupled with
the fact that passengers do not receive their tickets until after
payment constituted unfair bargaining.
Next, the dissent analyzed forum selection clause case law
and policy considerations as they relate to the consumer. Case
law prior to The Bremen consistently held forum selection
clauses such as the one in this case to be unenforceable.130 Jus-
tice Stevens offered disparate bargaining power and public inter-
est in deterring negligence as. two reasons for such holdings." 1
Also, the dissent questioned the majority's theory that passen-
gers will benefit in the form of reduced fares if cruise lines can
limit their exposure to suit.1 32 Justice Stevens reasoned that
under the majority's theory, all liability-limiting clauses, even
complete waivers of liability, would be enforceable.1 33 Enforce-
ment of such clauses would be "at odds with longstanding juris-
prudence." ' 4 According to the dissent, clauses tending to limit
liability hurt the consumer and therefore established doctrine
should be followed to keep such limitations in check.
Next, the dissent fully examined section 183c of the Limita-
tion of Liability Act. Definitively, the dissent stated that section
183c was enacted expressly to invalidate limitations on shipown-
ers' liability. Therefore, the dissent argued, the forum clause is
"null and void" under section 183c.135 The dissenters reasoned
that legislative history reveals Congress' intent to restrict all les-
sening of shipowners' liability and to "put a stop to all such
practices and practices of a like character."'136 Although the stat-
ute does not refer to forum selection clauses specifically, Justice
Stevens claimed that the statute's liberal language was broad
enough to encompass them..
3 7
Justice Stevens also noted that the Courts of Appeals, inter-
preting the analogous provision of COGSA, have unanimously
invalidated forum selection clauses incorporated in bills of lad-
130. Id. at 1530.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1530 n.4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1529.
136. Id. at 1532. See also H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936).
137. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1532. Justice Stevens writes, "[t]he absence of a specific
reference is adequately explained by the fact that such clauses were already unenforce-
able under the common law ... "
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ing.138 The forum selection clauses in those cases required suit to
be brought in foreign jurisdictions. 139 Although Carnival's forum
clause selected an American venue, Justice Stevens resolved that
the burdens faced by individual plaintiffs are proportional to the
cost to a corporation of conducting overseas litigation. Hence,
the dissent reasoned that analogous cases construing the Limita-
tion of Liability Act should have the same outcome as COGSA
cases decided by the Courts of Appeals.
Justice Stevens concluded by stating that even without the
benefit of section 183c, he would still apply the common law
prevalent prior to The Bremen and invalidate the forum
clause. 40 Clearly, the dissent grounded its censure of the major-
ity opinion on the need to protect the rights of cruise ship pas-
sengers, which rights case law and statute had formerly guarded.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the context of international and interstate contracts, fo-
rum selection clauses may be useful devices, lending certainty
and stability to a transaction."" However, in the setting of Car-
nival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, enforcement of a forum clause
is unfair and violative of both federal statute and legal prece-
dent. The Supreme Court, in an effort to serve the interests of
the justice system, has failed to defend the consumer that Con-
gress has specifically sought to protect."2
In 1936 Congress passed the Limitation of Liability Act to
prevent shipping lines from taking advantage of their passen-
gers. The Supreme Court's "plain language"" 3 analysis of the
Limitation of Liability Act fails to enforce Congress' intent. Fur-
thermore, it is this Comment's contention that the Supreme
Court misapplied the Court's holding and dictum in The
Bremen. Essentially nothing is left of the reasonableness test
laid out in The Bremen. To enforce a forum selection clause in a
contract between an unknowing consumer and a large corporate
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1533. See, e.g., Hughes Drilling Fluids v. MN Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840
(5th Cir. 1988); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.
1981); Indussa Corp. V. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
140. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1533.
141. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 2.
142. See Linda S. Mullenix, Forum-Shoppers Should Discover a Wider Market,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S12. ("Carnival Cruise Lines is a blatantly anti-consumer
decision.").
143. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
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defendant teeters on dangerous ground. The door has now
swung wide open for the travel industry to lessen, if not virtually
eliminate, its liability in cases where the corporate defendant en-
joys the upper-hand by utilizing adhesive consumer contracts.
A. The Court's Failure to Give Effect to the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act
The Supreme Court's application of the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act failed to give force to Congress' intent regarding the
1936 statute. The obvious purpose of the Limitation of Liability
Act is to prevent vessel owners from taking advantage of their
overwhelming bargaining power in their dealings with passen-
gers.144 The Court's validation of the forum clause, incorporated
in a form contract ticket between a corporate defendant and an
individual, fails to protect consumers - the group which Con-
gress aimed to protect.
An examination of the statute's legislative history exposes
the liberal intent that Congress had in mind when drafting the
statute. The following excerpt from the House Report empha-
sizes the statute's remedial purpose:
During the course of the hearings on the bill (H.R. 9969)
there was also brought to the attention of the committee a
practice of providing on the reverse side of steamship tickets
that in the event of damage or injury caused by the negligence
or fault of the owner or his servants, the liability of the owner
shall be determined by arbitration. The amendment to chapter
6 of title 48 of the Revised Statutes proposed to be made by
section 2 of the committee amendment is intended to, and in
the opinion of the committee will, put a stop to all such prac-
tices and practices of a like character. (emphasis added) 145
In the Supreme Court's decision, the majority focused on
the House Report's use of the word "arbitration.' ' 46 This focus,
144. Respondent's Brief at 36, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647).
145. H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936); see also S. REP. No. 2061,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936).
146. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1529, citing S. REP. No. 2061, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1936); H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936). ("The legislative history of §
183c suggests instead that this provision was enacted in response to passenger-ticket
conditions purporting to limit the shipowner's liability for negligence or to remove the
issue of liability from the scrutiny of any court by means of a clause providing that the
question of liability and the measure of damages shall be determined by arbitration.")
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combined with the statute's "plain language" reference to "a
trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction," lead the majority to
conclude that Congress only intended to do away with foreign
arbitration clauses, not to prohibit forum selection clauses. 47
The Court's conservative construction was ill conceived. Re-
medial statutes should be interpreted liberally to effectuate their
purpose.148 Accordingly, the Court should have eschewed their
plain language analysis and, alternatively, should have employed
a liberal reading to effectuate Congress' intent. The plain lan-
guage of a statute does not necessarily encompass legislative
purpose. 49 Clearly, the statute's expansive wording, providing
that any contractual stipulation "purporting. . .to lessen" a
shipowner's liability is void, would encompass forum selection
clauses. 50 The Supreme Court, in Just v. Chambers,'5' stated
that one purpose of the Limitation of Liability Act was "to af-
ford an opportunity for the determination of claims against the
vessel and its owners.' 1 52 Where a forum selection clause re-
quires the filing of a suit in a distant state, it serves as a large
deterrent to the filing of suits by consumers against large corpo-
rations.5 3 Indeed, the hurdles that a plaintiff might face, such as
high costs and inability to procure witnesses, might prove insu-
perable to effective relief. Accordingly, an expansive interpreta-
tion of section 183c would invalidate Carnival's forum clause be-
cause it does not afford plaintiffs such as the Shutes a realistic
opportunity to have their dispute litigated.
The application of a forum selection clause may not wholly
prevent a passenger from determination of his or her claim, but
it does present unreasonable hardship to the attainment of re-
dress. Often, traditional methods of statutory construction, such
as the Court's "plain language" analysis, lead to irrational re-
sults and should be forsaken in favor of a system which takes
into account the probable consequences of alternate interpreta-
147. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
148. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967).
149. It is a fallacy to assume that the plain language of a statute fully encompasses
legislative intent. Harry H. Wellington & Lee A. Albert, Statutory Interpretation and
the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YAL, L.J. 1547, 1549-50
(1963).
150. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. 312 U.S. 383 (1940).
152. Id. at 385.
153. See Yoder v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1986).
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tions. 15 4 A clause stipulating that a passenger must travel 3,000
miles to resolve a dispute certainly tends to "lessen, weaken or
avoid" a shipowner's liability by attaching cost and complexity.
This result is precisely what Congress intended to avoid by en-
acting section 183c.155 As a general rule, once a court "ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect." 5 " Given
Congress' intent to protect passengers against the avoidance of
shipowner liability, this rule dictates that the Court interpret
section 183c so as to allow plaintiffs such as the Shutes an op-
portunity to litigate their cases.
Although section 183c does not expressly proscribe forum
selection clauses, 57 another argument which supports the asser-
tion that its language encompasses forum selection clauses can
be found in case law prior to 1936. More specifically, the absence
of a specific reference to forum selection clauses in the Act is
explained by the fact that, under common law, such clauses were
already unenforceable at the time the statute was enacted.'58
Early forum selection clause history reveals a marked opposition
toward such agreements. Common reasons used to decline en-
forcement of forum selection clauses included "public policy"
and the assertion that such agreements should not "oust the ju-
risdiction" of competent courts. 5 ' In 1874 the Supreme Court
stated that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of juris-
diction conferred by law are illegal and void."'160 Because prior
case law such as this relied upon a public policy argument to
invalidate forum clauses, clauses such as the one in Carnival
would not have been used by carriers even prior to the passage
of the Act. Thus, Congress may have not anticipated a need to
proscribe forum clauses because the courts already did so. How-
ever, Congress did construct the statute with a wide breadth in
154. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 885 (1930).
155. Respondent's Brief at 36, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647).
156. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1983).
157. In fact, 46 U.S.C. § 183c does not specifically mention any clause at all. See
Official Transcript at 41, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Eulala Shute, Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647).
158. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1532 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461 (1990)).
159. For a discussion of forum selection clause history prior to 1936, see Gilbert,
supra note 4, at 12-13.
160. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (920 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
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order to condemn "all such practices," including jurisdictional
provisions.161 Accordingly, prior history evidences that section
183c is not inapplicable to forum clauses merely because it does
not expressly proscribe such clauses.
B. Comparison of the Limitation of Liability Act to The Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act
In 1936 Congress passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA). 6 2 COGSA represents the American enactment of the
Hague Rules, a series of international maritime conferences in
the 1920's.63 COGSA is part of an international effort to achieve
consistency and simplification of bills of lading used in interna-
tional trade.'64 In terms of statutory construction and breadth of
intent, COGSA and the Limitation of Liability Act are virtually
identical. 65 The Courts of Appeals, applying COGSA to cargo
cases, have refused to enforce forum selection provisions requir-
ing suit in foreign jurisdictions. 66 These cases have reasoned
that enforcement of forum selection clauses in cargo cases would
have the practical effect of substantially lessening carrier liabil-
ity.1 7 COGSA cases are arguably distinguishable from cases
such as Carnival in that COGSA cases involve disputes between
corporate litigants and foreign choice of forum provisions. How-
ever, the burden on individuals like the Shutes is akin to the
burden of overseas litigation for the cargo companies. 6 There-
fore, the similarities between the statutes are such that cases ap-
plying the statutes should yield comparable results.
The juxtaposition of COGSA section 1303(8) and section
161. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1936).
163. See Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.
1981).
164. Id. at 723.
165. The pertinent provision of COGSA, § 1303(8) reads as follows:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier of the ship from liability from loss or damage to or in connection with
the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations
provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided
in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance
in favor of the carrier, or similar clause, shall be deemed to be a clause reliev-
ing the carrier from liability.
166. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1532. See also Paul S. Edelman, The Supreme Court
and a Forum Selection Clause, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1991, at 9.
167. Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Altrigestione, 858 F.2d 905, 914 (3d Cir. 1988).
168. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1533 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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183c, both passed in 1936, reveals substantial similarity. COGSA
states that "any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of
carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability . . . or
lessening such liability. . . shall be null and void and of no ef-
fect."' 69 This language is indistinguishable from section 183c,
which nullifies "any provision or limitation . . . purporting...
to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant." 110 Consid-
ering the similarities in the wording that Congress chose, an in-
ference can be drawn that Congress intended for the statutes to
operate similarly. Courts interpreting COGSA have determined
that Congress specifically intended COGSA to prevent shipown-
ers from exercising unfair bargaining power.' Thus, any provi-
sion that lessens the carrier's liability is given no effect. There-
fore, it seems logical that when applying section 183c to a forum
clause requiring a plaintiff to travel across the United States in
order to file suit, a holding nullifying the clause would likewise
follow. The disparate treatment afforded these two provisions by
federal courts cannot be rationalized by an examination of the
text itself. Therefore, the Court's interpretation of section 183c
in Carnival must be viewed with skepticism given that the Court
examined the "plain language" of the statute.
A study of COGSA case law reveals that the Courts of Ap-
peals have regularly refused to enforce forum selection clauses.
The leading case applying COGSA to forum selection clauses is
Indussa Corporation v. S.S. Ranborg.12 Indussa, a New York
corporation, was the cosignee of nails and barbed wire being
shipped aboard a Norwegian ship, the Ranborg, from Antwerp,
Belgium to San Francisco. 7 3 In the bill of lading 74 there was a
clause that required all disputes to be settled in Norway while
the clause paramount made COGSA applicable."'5 Indussa, hav-
ing located the Ranborg in American waters, brought an in rem
action in New York district court alleging that the shipment had
169. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1936).
170. 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1936).
171. See, e.g., Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 724 (4th
Cir. 1981); Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Gately,
supra note 66, at 593.
172. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
173. Id.
174. A bill of lading is a receipt for goods, contract for their carriage, and docu-
mented evidence of title. Schwalb v. Erie R. Co., 293 N.Y.S. 842, 846 (Mun. Ct. 1937).
175. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 201.
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arrived damaged." 6 In response, the Norwegian shipowner
sought.to enforce the forum selection clause. 17 7 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, overturned precedent 7 8
and held that COGSA prohibited such clauses because they
might lessen a carrier's liability by subjecting the claim to a dis-
tant court.17 9 The court, noting the barrier that forum clauses
place in the way of enforcing liability, stated that such clauses
are "an effective means for carriers to secure settlements lower
than if cargo could sue in a convenient forum."
M
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, applying section 3(8) of
COGSA, overrode a foreign forum selection clause in Union In-
surance Society of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon.'8' The Elikon
controversy arose out of a shipment of air conditioners from Vir-
ginia to Kuwait aboard a West German-owned freighter. 82 Upon
delivery in Kuwait, the air conditioners were damaged. 183 Union
Insurance Society, as marine insurers, paid a substantial claim
to the cosignee of the cargo and subsequently sued the West
German shipowner for indemnification.18 The suit was brought
in admiralty in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia despite a forum selection clause in the bill of
lading designating the Court of Bremen, West Germany as the
contractual forum. 8 Another clause provided that the bill of
lading was subject to the provisions of COGSA. 88 The Elikon
court, citing Indussa, invalidated the forum clause under the au-
thority of COGSA. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, as op-
posed to the negotiated clause in The Bremen, the Elikon clause
was incorporated in an adhesion contract. 87 Noting that the
West German company was headquartered in Bremen, the court
suggested that Congress intended COGSA to ameliorate bills of
lading with one-sided form provisions such as the clause here. 188
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 204. The Second Circuit explicitly overruled Win. H. Muller & Co., Inc.
v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955).
179. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203.
180. Id.
181. 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).









The Elikon court did not intend to suggest that only jurisdic-
tional provisions found in adhesion contracts would be invali-
dated under COGSA. Indeed, the court, citing language from In-
dussa, stated that any jurisdictional provision requiring trial
abroad would be invalid under COGSA because the clause
"might" lessen the carrier's liability.18 9 Thus, under Elikon, the
mere chance that a forum clause might lessen liability would be
enough to render the clause unenforceable under COGSA.
The paramountcy of COGSA section 3(8) has been demon-
strated in forum selection clause litigation throughout the fed-
eral courts.19 Given the similarities between COGSA section
3(8) and the Limitation of Liability Act section 183c, as well as
the wealth of case law applying COGSA to forum clauses, one
must wonder why the majority failed to address COGSA in Car-
nival. The Supreme Court based its analysis in Carnival on the
holding of The Bremen, but failed to address COGSA. Perhaps
most important, The Bremen offered the view that forum selec-
tion clauses are presumptively valid in the absence of any con-
gressional policy on the subject.' 9' In fact, The Bremen court
expressly noted COGSA's inapplicability to the case. 9 ' Indeed,
COGSA was found inapplicable in The Bremen because a drill-
ing rig was not considered a "good" and there was no bill of lad-
ing.193 The Carnival Court failed to recognize dictum voiced in
The Bremen that explicitly noted the inapplicability of any
statute.
Instead, the Supreme Court should have applied the reason-
ing expressed in the COGSA decisions. As much as Congress in-
tended COGSA to ameliorate bills of lading with one-sided form
clauses, it likewise intended the Limitation of Liability Act to
operate in the same fashion regarding consumer contract form
clauses. Of course, the differences in the cases are apparent. Car-
nival dealt with an individual being forced to litigate her claim
in the "competent jurisdiction" of Florida, whereas the COGSA
189. Id. (citing Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1967)).
190. See Hughes Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1988)
(forum selection clause selecting The Republic of China tends to lessen the Chinese ship-
owners' liability); Conklin & Garrett Ltd. v. MN Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987)
(COGSA invalidates a choice of forum clause selecting a Finnish forum); see also Pacific
Lumber & Shipping Co. v. Star Shipping A/S, 464 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
191. See Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir.
1981); Nadelmann, supra note 62, at 134.
192. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1972).
193. See 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b); Elikon, 642 F.2d at 724 n.3.
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decisions dealt with large corporate litigants required to travel
overseas. The forum selection clause in Carnival does not man-
date suit in a foreign jurisdiction, and therefore might have less
of an impact on a victim's ability to recover.194 However, as pre-
viously mentioned, the burden on consumers like Mrs. Shute of
conducting a trial across the United States is likely to be propor-
tional to the additional cost incurred by a large corporation con-
ducting a trial overseas. 5 Had the majority considered the
COGSA decisions, they would have realized the inequity of forc-
ing a plaintiff to sue in a "distant court"'9 and how enforcement
of forum selection clauses tends to "lessen the [ship's] liabil-
ity. 1 97 It was unrealistic for the Court to believe that no reduc-
tion in Carnival's liability occurred upon enforcement of the
clause requiring the Shutes to litigate in Florida.
C. The Court's Misapplication of The Bremen
The Supreme Court, in an effort to serve judicial economy,
extended The Bremen precedent so as to equate sophisticated
commercial litigants with consumers who have little bargaining
power. The Court's balancing of the clause's reasonableness was
unevenly tipped in favor of the corporate defendant, as evi-
denced by the four factors cited by the Court to support its rea-
sonableness determination. Since the Supreme Court's 1972
Bremen decision, the Court has repeatedly shown favoritism to-
ward the enforcement of forum selection clauses. There can be
little doubt that the travel industry has taken notice.
The Bremen held that forum selection clauses are prima fa-
cie valid unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable. 98 In
evaluating the reasonableness of Carnival's forum clause, the
Court cited four factors, three of which benefited the corporate
defendant. The first factor cited is that forum clauses enable
cruise lines to limit the fora where they are sued. This factor
obviously benefits the cruise line. 19 The second and third fac-
tors, namely, adding certainty to an agreement and preserving
judicial resources, work together to express the goal of reducing
194. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1533 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967).
197. Hughes Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 1988).
198. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
199. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
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litigation to the benefit of both the cruise line and the courts. °°
The fourth factor reasons that consumers will benefit from re-
duced fares as the result of limiting the fora where cruise lines
would be amenable to suit.2 0' However, this fourth factor is weak
on theory and practical effect.202 Under this reasoning, all excul-
patory clauses could be enforced if passengers were compensated
by an imposed reduced fare.20s Certainly, allowing shipowners to
avoid all liability in cases such as this one cannot be considered
beneficial to passengers if the only benefit received from the
shipowners' exculpation is a slightly reduced passenger fare.
Given the fact that three out of the four factors cited by the
Court in no way reflect the impact of the forum clause on pas-
sengers, it is hard to see how the Court was able to use these
factors to judge the reasonableness of subjecting such passengers
to the clause's harsh terms.
Clearly, the Supreme Court's "reasonableness" analysis fails
to properly balance the interest of individual consumers. The
Bremen court recognized that a forum clause may be unreasona-
ble if the contractual forum is seriously inconvenient for the
plaintiff.2 4 Such inconvenience can be proven if the party seek-
ing to escape the clause is "for all practical purposes . ..de-
prived of his day in court."2 05 There is little doubt that being
forced to travel across the continental United States to resolve a
slip-and-fall case would constitute serious inconvenience. Fur-
thermore, although the majority disagreed,20 6 the Court of Ap-
peals did find evidence that the Shutes were physically and fi-
nancially unable to litigate in Florida.207 Admittedly, one party's
inconvenience is another party's convenience, but an individual
faced with suing a large corporate defendant in a distant state is
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Mullenix, supra note 142, at S12. ("Apart from the justices, are there any
consumers naive enough to buy the reduced fare theory?"); Official Transcript at 46.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Eulala Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (No. 89-1647). This
reduced fare theory comes at a time when international travel has become increasingly
expensive. For instance, international air carriers have increased fares significantly in
response to the Persian Gulf crisis. See Agis Salpukas, Higher Fares on Foreign Flights
Due, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at D1.
203. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1530 n.4.
204. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
205. Id. at 18.
206. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
207. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
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very likely to be deterred.208 Indeed, only the most financially
well-off passenger would be able to overcome the hurdles of high
costs and inability to secure witnesses in a distant forum. 9
This is not to imply that all forum selection clauses in form
ticket contracts should be ruled invalid. A court must still assess
the reasonableness of the clause in the context of each case. 10 In
Carnival, Florida's only connection to the transaction is that
Carnival Cruise Lines is headquartered there.21' The Tropicale
sailed from California and returned there.212 Additionally, none
of the witnesses lived in or near Florida when the action was
commenced.1 Almost all of the lay and medical witnesses live
in Washington.214 Thus, based on the facts of this case, Florida
is an inconvenient and unfair forum.
However, The Bremen Court stressed that inconvenience is
not a sufficient defense against the enforcement of a forum
clause if such inconvenience was foreseeable at the time of con-
tracting.215 The Carnival Court found the forum clause was com-
municated to the Shutes and, thus, the presumption is that the
Shutes should get what they bargained for.2 16 Of course, the fo-
rum selection clause was communicated to the Shutes "as much
as three pages of fine print can be communicated. '217 In Carni-
val, there was no bargaining. The Carnival ticket amounted to
208. Yoder v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986).
209. It would be a mistake to assume that only the well-to-do are cruise ship passen-
gers and, therefore, can afford distant litigation. For example, many people save for years
to go on a cruise line vacation.
210. See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Pa. 1987);
Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (Both cases
upheld forum selection clauses where there was no serious inconvenience to plaintiffs
resulting from a lawsuit in Florida.).
211. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1991).
212. Id.
213. Respondent's Brief at 34, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991) (No. 89-1647).
214. Id.
215. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972). See also Gruson,
supra note 2, at 180.
216. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1525; see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32.
217. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
A later district court case found the Supreme Court's presumption that the Shutes
had actual notice of the forum selection clause to be dispositive. In Berman v. Cunard
Line, Ltd, 771 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1991), the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida denied a Motion to Transfer that was grounded upon a
forum selection clause. The district court stated that Carnival is not controlling where
the plaintiff had never read the cruise ticket nor was aware of the venue provision re-
quiring suit to be brought in New York.
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an adhesion contract21 8 offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 219
Thus, the forum selection clause presented the Shutes with "an
unreasonable disadvantage and thereby subvert[ed] the interests
of justice.
220
D. Carnival: The Court's Green Light for the Selection of
Foreign Contractual Venues
Carnival has extended an invitation to foreign corporations
involved in international travel. It invites such corporations to
select a foreign jurisdiction as the contractual forum, thereby
potentially lessening their liability. The travel industry is a big
business, ranking second only to petroleum as an item of world
trade.221 The greatest percentage of tourism expenditures was
spent for vacation and personal reasons.222 The extension of The
Bremen precedent to consumers could lead to abuse and to a
dramatic lessening of liability for foreign travel-related busi-
nesses. For example, because Carnival Cruise Lines is incorpo-
rated in Panama,22 ' Carnival could theoretically select Panama
as the contractual forum. Indeed, Panama is no more connected
to the Shutes' claim than is Florida. Moreover, Panamanian law
permits forum selection clauses by statute.224 Although the
Court did not explicitly address foreign forum clauses, under the
court's reasoning, all of the same considerations apply to foreign
jurisdictions. As long as the clause is "reasonably communi-
cated" to the passenger, the clause will be enforced.2 25
218. Almost by definition, an adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered by
an offeror who possesses superior economic bargaining power. See Gilbert, supra note 4,
at 36.
219. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir.
1966); see also Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1978)(where all records and witnesses were located in the U.S., a forum selection
clause selecting German courts as the chosen forum is unreasonable and unenforceable).
Furthermore, the Carnival decision is inconsistent with the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law. The Restatement suggests that courts should invalidate forum selection
clauses when the transaction is unfair or unreasonable. RESTATEhiENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAW § 80 (1971); see also Gruson, supra note 2, at 173.
221. William J. Knudsen, Jr., Jurisdiction Over the Travel Industry: A Proposal to
End Its Preferential Treatment, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 101.
222. Id.
223. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1533 n.6.
224. Panamanian Judiciary Code art. 237; see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 23.
225. The reasonable communicativeness test was first adopted by the Second Cir-
cuit in Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d Cir.
1968)(a limiting provision in a contract that is reasonably communicated to the passen-
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A survey of international law reveals that most countries
will permit clauses which assign exclusive jurisdiction to their
own courts. This will be particularly true where the selected for-
eign jurisdiction favors forum selection clauses. For example, the
general rule in England is that forum clauses are prima facie
valid.226 English courts accept submission by parties to hear dis-
putes in England,227 because it is England's view that respect
should be given to the party's choice.22 s Likewise, Spain and It-
aly both favor prorogation clauses. 29 Other countries, such as
Mexico and Cuba, favor these clauses as well. 23 0 Additionally,
Belgium and Germany enforce forum selection clauses where the
parties have no link to the country. 1 Consequently, many for-
eign courts will confer jurisdiction based solely on a freely-nego-
tiated forum clause.
It is worthy to note, however, that some foreign courts will
place limitations on forum selection clauses. For instance, the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, in deciding an admiralty dis-
pute, has ruled that a forum selection clause will not be enforced
where parties totally unconnected to the Netherlands have se-
lected Dutch courts as the contractual forum.23 2 This case stands
in contrast to The Bremen, where an American corporation and
a German corporation, both unconnected to England, chose the
London Court of Justice as the contractual forum.233 Had the
parties in The Bremen chosen the Netherlands to settle their
ger is binding). The First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have all adopted the reasona-
ble communicativeness test. See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347 (lst
Cir. 1988); Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1987); Carpenter v. Klos-
ters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1979); Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1983).
226. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 20. However, the courts of England treat jurisdic-
tion clauses ousting their jurisdiction with no clear pattern. See The Fehrman, [1958] 1
All E.R. 333 (English courts ought not be ousted of jurisdiction by a jurisdiction clause
in a bill of lading); The "Star of Luxor", [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 139 (upholding clause
requiring arbitration in Egypt); The "Panseptos", [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 152 (Ethiopian
forum clause invalidated, English court proceeded).
227. Transocean Towage Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd., Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden, [1987] ECC 282.
228. Id.
229. Joseph M. Perillo, Jr., Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, 13 AM.
J. Comp. L. 163 (1964).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Transocean Towage Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd., Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden, [1987] ECC 282.
233. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
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disputes, a Dutch court would have found the clause to be insuf-
ficient to establish jurisdiction.
The likelihood that foreign travel-related companies will se-
lect foreign jurisdictions as the contractual forum is supported
by a string of opinions dating back to The Bremen. 34 These
opinions express a strict adherence to validating forum selection
clauses. 3 5 In addition, lower federal courts have taken a more
hospitable attitude toward forum selection clauses, applying the
holding of The Bremen to a broad spectrum of commercial and
non-commercial cases set in both domestic and foreign fora.2 36
Pervasive foreign enforcement of forum selection clauses, cou-
pled with federal encouragement of such clauses, points to the
inevitable widespread incorporation of foreign jurisdictions as
contractual forums in passenger ticket contracts.
Finally, following Carnival, the strength of the COGSA de-
cisions is called into question.23  The Supreme Court ignored
Congress' liberal intent in the Limitation of Liability Act, thus
creating doubt as to the statutory underpinnings of COGSA.
However, since Carnival, the United States District Court for
Puerto Rico stated that the rationale behind the COGSA case
law denying enforcement of forum selection clauses has not been
eroded.2 31 In Lloyd's of London v. The M/V Steir,239 a dispute
between an English insurer and a French carrier, the Puerto
Rico district court found that Carnival did not overrule prior
COGSA decisions. The court held that the forum selection
clause requiring disputes to be brought in France was not en-
forceable.240 Moreover, the district court emphasized that Carni-
val "represents a recurring fantasy of shipowners and cargo de-
fense lawyers. ' 241 This "fantasy" may come true by allowing
corporations to select such distant forums as "Timbuktu or By-
234. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
235. Some federal courts also afford the travel industry preferential treatment. See
Knudsen, supra note 221, at 101.
236. For extensive citation of federal expansion of The Bremen, see Mullenix, supra
note 26, at 294 n.7.
237. See Edelman, supra note 166, at 9. See also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selec-
tion Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congres-
sional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1992) (Carnival "makes clear that COGSA is no
longer an obstacle to the enforcement of forum selection agreements.").
238. Lloyd's of London v. The MN Steir, 773 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D.P.R. 1991).
239. Id. at 525.
240. Id. at 527.
241. Id. at 527 n.1.
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elorussia" as the contractual forum.242 The court maintained
that clauses which required litigation in far-off forums would
render lawsuits economically unfeasible.243
E. Alternative Analysis: A Return to the Traditional Notions
of Fair Play
Whether Carnival's extension of The Bremen to encompass
commercial consumer forum contracts will apply to foreign juris-
diction provisions is not yet known. Courts asked to decide such
disputes will be faced with interesting problems. This Comment
suggests that future courts should analyze foreign forum clause
problems by employing traditional jurisdictional doctrine rather
than contractual principles. 44 By employing "traditional notions
of fair play, '245 a jurisdictional analysis will protect both parties
and will prevent the commercial travel business from insulating
itself from suit.
Under Carnival, forum selection clauses are evaluated by a
reasonableness test based on contract principles. These contract
principles do not adequately protect the consumer. Instead,
courts faced with foreign forum clause disputes might protect
the consumer against the burden of overseas litigation by invok-
ing jurisdictional principles.246 The distinction between applying
contractual principles and jurisdictional principles may be seen
by examining the two systems at work. Under the Carnival test,
no mention is made of the reasonableness of the forum. Under
jurisdictional principles, in contrast, the forum clause must bear
a reasonable relationship to the transaction. 247 For example, in
242. Id. at 527.
243. Id. (In The MIV Steir, the claim was for $82,639.44. The court stated that if
the plaintiff was forced to litigate in France, the contractual forum, much of that award
would be spent on attorney's fees, witness fees, and travel expenses.)
244. See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 372.
245. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
246. While many expected the Supreme Court to address jurisdictional issues in
Carnival, see Mullenix, supra note 67, the Court declined to do so. The Court found the
forum selection clause issue to be dispositive in determining whether the Court of Ap-
peals erred in allowing the district court to hear the Shutes' claim. Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991).
247. See Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 215 (W.D. Tenn.
1985) (choice-of-law provision is valid absent a showing that the forum does not bear a
reasonable relationship to the transaction); additionally, both the U.C.C. and the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws require some kind of "reasonable relationship" or
"substantial relationship" to the forum in order to be enforced. See U.C.C. § 1-105
(1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
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Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione,248 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced a forum selection clause
that provided Italy as the contracted forum. In Hodes, passen-
gers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro brought claims arising out
of the infamous terrorist hijacking in the Mediterranean Sea.249
The cruise ship sailed under the Italian flag and the voyage be-
gan and ended in Italy. 50 Clearly, Italy bore a substantial rela-
tionship to the complained-of transaction and would satisfy a
jurisdictional reasonableness test. In Carnival, the cruise began
and ended in California and Mrs. Shute's accident occurred off
the coast of Mexico. Florida, the contractual forum, did not bear
a relationship to the complained of transaction; thus, the forum
clause would not be enforced under a jurisdictional test. As illus-
trated by this example, a jurisdictional analysis would not reflex-
ively invalidate foreign jurisdictional provisions. Instead, to sat-
isfy the jurisdictional test, the chosen forum would have to be
reasonably related to the transaction.
Dating back to the seminal jurisdiction case, International
Shoe, Inc. v. Washington,251 the Supreme Court has extolled the
value of fairness in jurisdictional disputes. International Shoe
and its progeny have analyzed jurisdictional disputes pursuant
to a reasonableness theorem. For example, at issue in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 252 was whether an
Oklahoma federal court possessed personal jurisdiction over a
New York automobile dealer when an automobile sold by the
defendant in New York became involved in an accident in
Oklahoma.2 53 The Supreme Court denied the Oklahoma court
jurisdiction. The Court doubted whether the New York automo-
bile dealer could "reasonably [have] anticipated" being subject
to a lawsuit in Oklahoma.254 The same type of question should
be asked in evaluating the reasonableness of a forum selection
clause in a consumer form contract. Namely, the court should
determine whether the consumer reasonably could have antici-
pated a foreign venue as the exclusive cite for litigation. The ac-
tual notice given to the consumer, as well as the relationship be-
248. 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 906.
251. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
252. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 297.
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tween the forum and the transaction, must be closely examined
by the courts to protect the interests of both parties.
Furthermore, a jurisdictionally-based approach can be uti-
lized without offending Carnival's redefined reasonableness test.
The four factors that led the Supreme Court to enforce Carni-
val's forum selection clause can be addressed and reconciled
under this Comment's alternate analysis. The first two factors
cited by the Court, limiting the fora where a cruise line may be
sued and adding certainty to a transaction, are fatally flawed
under contract principles. Under contractual doctrine, the only
party whose interests are being served is the corporate defend-
ant. In contrast, both concerns can be addressed rationally and
equitably under jurisdictional doctrine. First, by selecting a fo-
rum that has substantial factual contacts with the transaction, a
cruise line can limit the fora where it will be amenable to suit
and thereby satisfy a jurisdictional test. For instance, had Carni-
val selected Los Angeles, the port of departure, the restriction of
suit would have been reasonably foreseeable to passengers like
the Shutes and would have also served to limit the forum in or-
der to serve Carnival's interests. 5 Second, a jurisdictional test
also serves to promote a greater degree of foreseeability as to
where a dispute might be litigated. In the case of a form ticket
contract containing small-print clauses, the only party who will
likely be aware of the situs of litigation will be the corporate
defendant.2 56 Fairness principles underlying a jurisdictional ap-
proach demand that such a clause select a reasonable forum.
While the consumer might still not be aware of the contractual
forum, she would still be able to reasonably foresee the forum's
selection. Thus, under a jurisdictional regime, a cruise line could
limit its amenability to suit while still selecting a forum that
would be fair and foreseeable to the consumer.
The third factor identified by the Court reasoned that fo-
rum selection clauses eliminate the need for courts to entertain
jurisdictional disputes, thereby preserving judicial resources.
The Supreme Court designed Carnival to clear up forum selec-
tion clause issues and spare United States courts the time and
effort necessary to decide jurisdictional conflicts. However, one
commentator suggests that Carnival has only clouded forum se-1
255. Presumably, the now much-heralded voyage transported passengers from many
states. Hence, the selection of Los Angeles as the contractual forum would limit the fora
where Carnival would be subject to suit.
256. See Mullenix, supra note 142, at S12.
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lection clause issues by emasculating The Bremen reasonable-
ness test and leaving many issues unresolved.57 In the case of a
forum selection clause where a foreign venue is the "agreed-
upon" forum, fairness dictates that a jurisdictional standard be
applied. Undoubtedly, a jurisdictional approach will force courts
to entertain litigation in contravention of the third justification
provided in Carnival. But, simply put, the balancing of unfair-
ness to the consumer versus judicial economy tips in favor of the
consumer. In addition, it seems that Carnival itself has not ex-
tinguished forum clause litigation. Several cases have been heard
in federal courts interpreting and analyzing Carnival.25s Perhaps
Carnival is already failing to meet its goal of providing judicial
economy. A foreign forum clause cannot be wholly dispositive.
Indeed, courts must analyze the foreign choice of forum with an
eye toward equity.
Further, this Comment suggests that a jurisdictional analy-
sis will obviate the need for judicial resolution more quickly
than the application of contract principles. By requiring corpo-
rations to select reasonably related forums rather than granting
a presumption of prima facie validity, corporations will fall in
line and provide consumers with fair, albeit limited, choices for
litigation. Initially, foreign forum selection clause disputes will
be decided on a case-by-case basis in conflict with the goals of
Carnival. In the long run, however, jurisdictional analysis will
promote economic fairness rather than foster economic burden.
The fourth rationale offered by the Court was based on the
presumption that by limiting the fora where a cruise line would
be amenable to suit, a cruise line could offer consumers reduced
fares. Putting aside the Court's faulty assumption that cruise
lines will indeed reduce their fares in exchange for contractual
limitations on the plaintiff's choice of forum, 259 a jurisdictional
approach could serve the Court's theory just as well as a con-
tractual approach. As stated previously, cruise lines can still
limit the fora where they may be sued and utilize their savings
257. See Borchers, supra note 237, at 97. (Professor Borchers maintains that legisla-
tive reform, rather than judicial doctrine, would better resolve the unsettled issues left
after Carnival.).
258. See, e.g., Milanovich v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763 (D.D.C. 1992);
Berman v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 771 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
259. See Borchers, supra note 237, at 94 (". . . to ask a consumer to make a rea-
soned judgment as to the economic benefits and burdens of competing forum selection
clauses strains reality."); see also Mullenix, supra note 142, at S12.
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to offer reduced fares.
This Comment does not argue for, nor will it try to formu-
late, an explicit standard for determining jurisdictional reasona-
bleness. Fairness cannot be codified. It is an imprecise concept
that must be applied on a case-by-case basis. However, in light
of the rise in international business transactions and subsequent
increased employment of forum selection clauses, courts must
endeavor to more effectively protect the unknowing consumer.
V. CONCLUSION
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Supreme Court
has unjustifiably enforced a forum selection clause in a con-
sumer adhesion contract, thereby equating consumers with ex-
perienced business persons in terms of both bargaining power
and financial resources. This new application of contract doc-
trine by the Court burdens the economically disadvantaged con-
sumer without taking into account reasonableness or fairness. In
so holding, the Court has ignored federal statute and prior case
law and has failed to give deference to the plaintiff's choice of
forum.
More particularly, the Supreme Court in Carnival failed to
adequately examine the circumstances surrounding the passage
of the Limitation of Liability Act, thereby misconstruing the
statute's broad intent. Additionally, the Court ignored case law
construing COGSA, a statute comparable to the Limitation of
Liability Act in text and purpose. The COGSA cases have con-
sistently invalidated forum selection clauses due to concern that
such clauses would limit a vessel owner's liability in conflict with
the statute. The conspicuous similarities seen in the texts of
COGSA and the Limitation of Liability Act should lead courts
to follow COGSA precedent and invalidate forum clauses con-
tained in passenger ticket contracts.
Further, the Court extended The Bremen precedent so as to
equate freely negotiated commercial contracts with standardized
contracts which were the product of little, if any, negotiation.
Given the preference other countries have shown toward forum
clause enforcement and the strict adherence to forum clause en-
forcement expressed by the Supreme Court, the American con-
sumer may now be forced to overcome high hurdles to bring liti-
gation in alien fora. Thus, Carnival presents the travel industry
with a muscular ability to designate a foreign forum in advance
of litigation. Hence, Carnival will be a boon to the travel indus-
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try and a handicap to consumers.
This Comment suggests that forum clauses selecting foreign
jurisdictions should be analyzed under traditional jurisdictional
doctrine. Under a jurisdictional reasonableness test, both parties
to a contract, rather than just the corporate defendant, will have
their interests protected. While the need for contractual cer-
tainty offered by forum clauses is great, as the Supreme Court in
Carnival suggests, the need to protect the consumer from unfair
practices is equally great. A jurisdictional reasonableness test
recognizes that the goals of contractual certainty and consumer
protection are equally worthy of preservation in the forum selec-
tion clause context.
Edward P. Gilbert

